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Abstract
We propose a new definition of the representation
theorem for many-valued logics, with modal operators
as well, and define the stronger relationship between
algebraic models of a given logic and relational struc-
tures used to define the Kripke possible-world semantics
for it. Such a new framework offers a new semantics
for many-valued logics based on the truth-invariance
entailment. Consequently, it is substantially different
from current definitions based on a matrix with a des-
ignated subset of logic values, used for the satisfaction
relation, often difficult to fix. In the case when the
many-valued modal logics are based on the set of truth-
values that are complete distributive lattices we obtain
a compact autoreferential Kripke-style canonical repre-
sentation. The Kripke-style semantics for this subclass
of modal logics have the joint-irreducible subset of the
carrier set of many-valued algebras as set of possible
worlds. A significant member of this subclass is the
paraconsistent fuzzy logic extended by new logic values
in order to also deal with incomplete and inconsistent
information. This new theory is applied for the case
of autoepistemic intuitionistic many-valued logic, based
on Belnap’s 4-valued bilattice, as a minimal extension
of classical logic used to manage incomplete and incon-
sistent information as well.
1 Introduction
Many-valued logic was conceived as a logic for un-
certain, incomplete and possibly inconsistent informa-
tion which is very close to the statements containing
the words ”necessary” and ”possible”, that is, to the
statements that make an assertion about the mode of
truth of some other statement. Algebraic semantics
interprets modal connectives as operators, while Rela-
tional semantics uses relational structures, often called
Kripke models, whose elements are thought of variously
as being possible worlds; for example, moments of time,
belief situations, states of a computer, etc.. The two
approaches are closely related: the subsets of relational
structures form an algebra with modal operators, while
conversely any modal algebra can be embedded into
an algebra of subsets of a relational structure via ex-
tensions of Stone’s Boolean representation theory. For
example, the first (1934) and the most known Stone’s
representation theorem for Boolean algebras [1], is the
duality between the category of Boolean algebras and
the category of Stone spaces. Every Boolean alge-
bra (BA,+, ·, \, 0, 1), where +, ·, \ are corresponding
algebraic operations (addition, multiplication and com-
plement) for classical logic connectives ∨,∧,¬ respec-
tively, is isomorphic to an algebra of particular clopen
(i.e., simultaneously closed and open) subsets of its
Stone space. Stone’s theorem has since been the model
for many other similar representation theorems. Our
representation theorem, in the case of distributive com-
plete lattice of truth values, is a particular Stone-like
autoreferential representation based on the particular
subsets of these truth-values.
In order to be able to follow this paper the readers
must have clear in mind the difference between a many-
valued logic and its underlying algebra of truth-values
(for example, the propositional logic and its Boolean
algebra, the intuitionistic logic and its Heyting alge-
bra), so that we can informally use the term lattice (of
algebraic truth values) speaking about logics as well.
Given two sets A and B, we denote by AB , the set of
all functions from B to A, by An the n-th cartesian
product A× ...×A, and by P(A) the powerset of A.
The representation theorems are based on Lindenbaum
algebra of a logic  L = (V ar,Ø,), where V ar is a set
of propositional symbols of a language  L, Ø is the set
of logical connectives and  is the entailment relation
of this logic. We denote by F ( L) the set of all formu-
lae. Notice that the truth-values in A ⊂ V ar ⊆ F ( L)
are the constant propositional symbols as well, and
we will use the same symbols for them as those used
for elements in A, with the bottom and top elements
0, 1 respectively. Lindenbaum algebra of  L is the quo-
tient algebra F ( L)/ ≡, where for any two formulae
φ, ψ ∈ F ( L), it holds that φ ≡ ψ iff φ  ψ
and ψ  φ .
The algebraic existential modal operators oi : A →
A, i = 1, 2, ..., are monotonic, additive (oi(x ∨ y) =
oi(x) ∨ oi(y)) and oi(0) = 0) (the universal modal op-
erators are monotonic and multiplicative oi(x ∧ y) =
oi(x) ∧ oi(y), oi(1) = 1). They appear often in
many-valued logics, for example, as conflation operator
(knowledge negation [2]) and Moore’s autoepistemic
operator [3] in Belnap’s 4-valued bilattice [4] (in Exam-
ple 8), or modal operators L and M of Lukasiewicz’s
4-valued logic [5, 6, 7], or recently in [8, 9, 10, 11]. The
correspondent set of logical modal operators (existen-
tial and universal) will be denoted in standard way by
♦i ∈ Ø and i ∈ Ø respectively.
A many-valued modal logic here is a truth-functional
many-valued logic with a non-empty set of modal op-
erators with properties defined above.
A valuation I as a mapping I : V ar → A such that
for any x ∈ A, I(x) = x. It can be uniquely extended
to the homomorphism I : F ( L)→ A (for example, for
any p, q ∈ V ar, I(p⊙ q) = I(p)⊙ I(q),⊙ ∈ {∧,∨,⇒},
I(¬p) = ¬I(p), and I(♦ip) = oi(I(p)), where ∧,∨,⇒
,¬ are conjunction, disjunction, implication and nega-
tion respectively). We denote by Vm the set of all
valuations in AV ar.
Relevant work: we will briefly present the previous
work, based on algebraic matrices, and explain some
weak points of such a matrix-based approach.
The standard approach to representation theorems uses
a subset D ⊂ A of the set of truth values A, denom-
inated designated elements; informally the designated
elements represent the equivalence class of the theo-
rems of  L. Given an algebra A = (A, {o}o∈Ø), the
Ø-matrix is the pair (A, D), where D ⊂ A is a subset
of designated elements. The algebraic satisfaction rela-
tion |=a (’a’ stands for ’algebraic’) is defined as follows:
Definition 1 Let  L = (V ar,Ø,) be a logic, (A, D)
a Ø-matrix, and φ ∈ F ( L). Let I : V ar → A be a map
that assigns logic values to propositional variables, and
I : F ( L) → A be its unique extension to all formulae
in a language  L. Let M be a class of Ø-matrices. We
define the relation |=a inductively as follows:
1. (A, D) |=aI φ iff I(φ) ∈ D,
2. (A, D) |=a φ iff I(φ) ∈ D for every I : V ar → A,
3. M |=a φ iff (A, D) |=a φ for every (A, D) ∈M.
A logic  L is sound w.r.t. M iff for every φ ∈ F ( L), if
 L  φ then M |=a φ.
 L is complete w.r.t. M iff for every φ ∈ F ( L), if
M |=a φ then  L  φ.
Dual to algebraic semantics, based on the classM of Ø-
matrices we also have the Kripke-style semantics based
on a classR of relational models where the satisfiability
relation |=r is defined by induction on the structure
of the formulae. Substantially, each relational model
K ∈ R is a Kripke frame over a set of possible worlds
with additional accessibility relations between possible
worlds associated with logical operators. The distinc-
tive feature of this relational semantics is that the ac-
cessibility relations are used in the definition of satisfi-
ability, which is not just a mechanical truth-functional
translation of the formula structure into the model.
The definition of the algebraic/relational duality is
based on the following assumption:
Definition 2 Representation Assumption [12]
Assume that there exists a class R of relational struc-
tures such that there exist D : M → R, E : R → M
such that (C):
(i) for every K ∈ R, E(K) = (AK , DK) ∈ M, where
AK is an algebra of subsets of the support of K;
(ii) for every M = (A, D) ∈ M, if E(D(M)) =
(AD(M), DD(M)) then there is an injective homomor-
phism in : A→ AD(M) with i
−1
n (DD(M)) ⊆ D.
Let m : V ar → AK be a meaning function (assigns
logic values to propositional variables), then (K,m)
is the Kripke model for a frameK. Then, the definition
of the relation |=r can be given as follows:
Definition 3 [12] Assume that M and R satisfy con-
dition (C)(i). Let K ∈ R, m : V ar → AK , and
m : F ( L) → AK be the unique homomorphism of Ø-
algebras that extends m. Let y be an element in the
support of K, Then:
1. K |=rm,y φ iff y ∈ m(φ);
2. K |=rm φ iff m(φ) ∈ DK ;
3. K |=r φ iff for every m, K |=rm φ .
A logic  L is sound w.r.t. R iff for every φ ∈ F ( L), if
 L  φ then R |=r φ.  L is complete w.r.t. R iff for
every φ ∈ F ( L), if R |=r φ then  L  φ.
In [12] it is demonstrated that if  L = (V ar,Ø,) is
sound and complete w.r.t. a class M of Ø-matrices,
and there exists a class R such that the Assumption
(C) holds, then  L is sound and complete w.r.t. the class
of Kripke-style models KM,R = {(K,m)| K ∈ R,m :
V ar→ AK where E(K) = (AK , DK)}.
The strong and weak points of this approach:
2
• In a matrix-based many-valued logic, a formula
is satisfied if its logic value is a designated value.
Such an approach, based on Ø-matrices, is very ef-
fective for all kinds of 2-valued logic where the set
of designated elements is a singleton set composed
by only true value, D = {1}, as in the case of clas-
sical, intuitionistic and 2-value modal logics (ex-
tension of Boolean algebra). It is only a partially
good solution for the case when a set of truth-
values can not be easily divided into two comple-
mentary subsets: D ⊂ A for values for which we
retain that a formula can be considered satisfied,
and its complement A\D for those which we retain
that a formula cannot be considered satisfied. For
example, in the case of fuzzy logic where A = [0, 1]
(the closed set of reals between 0 and 1) we can
assume that D = [a, 1] is the closed set between
some prefixed value 0 < a < 1 and 1. But is not
clear what is the correct value for a for generally
acceptable fuzzy logic (otherwise we will have an
infinite number of different logics for each an ar-
bitrary value a).
An analog difficulty we can find in the case of bi-
lattices [13, 2, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18].
• The second observation is that the representation
theorems define the isomorphism between a many-
valued algebra and the set-based algebra that is a
subalgebra of the canonical extension of the origi-
nal many-valued algebra. It will be useful to define
directly such an isomorphism based on the duality
assumption (C).
Main contribution: The main contribution, pre-
sented in Section 3, is a general representation theorem
for many-valued logics with the truth-invariance entail-
ment for any set of truth-values A (also if it is not a
lattice). It is substantially different w.r.t the previous
representation theorems that are all based on matrices,
and is based on algebraic models of a logic. We replace
the duality Algebras (Matrices) - Relational structures
described in previous work, by the semantic duality Al-
gebraic models - Kripke models. The novelty is that the
set of models of a given logic can be obtained by using
Gentzen-like sequent calculi [19] without using neces-
sarily the subset of designated elements (matrices). As
a guiding example instead, here in Section 2, will be
presented a more specific case, when a logic is based
on complete distributive lattice A. These sequent-
based representations of many-valued logics with truth-
invariance entailment allows us to define, without using
the matrices, the set of models of a given many-valued
logic, required by general definitions in Section 3. This
particular example in Section 2, when A is complete
distributive lattice, is then used in Section 4 for a con-
crete definition of Kripke frames based on an autorefer-
ential assumption [20] where the set of possible worlds
is fixed by a subset of algebraic truth values in A.
This paper is based on the idea that the satisfaction re-
lation (and the entailment) in the case of many-valued
logics can be defined without using the subset of desig-
nated elements. For example, in the case of logic pro-
grams, let I : V ar → A be a many-valued valuation,
and (A,⊑) be the set A of logic values with partial
truth order ⊑. Then, given any rule B ← B1 ∧ ...∧Bn
where B is a propositional letter and Bi is a ground
literal (propositional letter or negation of them), we
say that it is satisfied iff I(B) ⊒ I(B1) ∧ ... ∧ I(Bn);
the valuation that satisfies all rules is a model for such
a logic program. As we have seen in this case, instead
of the subset D ⊆ A of designated elements, we simply
use the truth ordering between logic values.
The simple way to extend this example to any propo-
sitional logic  L = (V ar,Ø,) is to consider equiva-
lently this logic as a sequent system of (structural and
logical) rules R : s1,...,sk
s
where each si is a sequent
φ1, .., φn ⊢ ψ1, ..., ψm where, accordingly to Gentzen,
the commas in the left are conjunctions while those on
the right are disjunctions, and φi, ψj ∈ F ( L) are logic
formulae. We say that a valuation I : V ar → A satis-
fies this sequent iff I(φ1)∧..∧I(φn) ⊑ I(ψ1)∨...∨I(ψm),
and that I satisfies a rule R iff I satisfies the conclusion
sequent s of this rule whenever it satisfies all sequent
premises s1, ..., sk of this rule. Then, a model of this
logic is any valuation I which satisfies all logic sequent
rules of this logic (the structural sequent rules as Iden-
tity, Cut, Weakening, Permutation, Contraction and
Associativity rules are satisfied by all valuations).
Notice that this sequent-based approach is always
possible, independently of the algebraic properties of
the set of truth-values in A, for example by trans-
forming the original many-valued logic into 2-valued
modal logic [21, 22], and defining the classical 2-valued
sequent rules as presented in [19] with the truth-
invariance entailment for many-valued logics. This
truth-invariance entailment will be used for a new rep-
resentation theorem in this paper (in Definition 6). No-
tice that the sequent system can be used also as a basis
for an autoreferential algebraic/relational semantics of
many-valued logics [20].
In what follows we denote by y ⊏ x iff (y ⊑ x and not
x ⊑ y), and we denote by x ⊲⊳ y two unrelated elements
in A (so that not (x ⊑ y or y ⊑ x)).
We define the following mapping ↓: A → P(A) such
that for any element x ∈ A, we obtain the closed set
↓ x = {a ∈ A |a ⊑ x }. It is well known that for any
two elements of a complete lattice x, y ∈ A holds the set
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intersection closure property ↓ x
⋂
↓ y =↓ (x ∧ y), but
does not hold the union closure property, that is, gen-
erally does not exists z ∈ A such that ↓ x
⋃
↓ y =↓ z.
But the closure property for the intersection and union
holds for the more general case of hereditary subsets : a
set B ∈ P(A) is hereditary if it is closed downwards un-
der ⊑, i.e., if we have that whenever x ∈ B and y ⊑ x
then y ∈ B. Notice that the bottom hereditary subset
of any complete lattice A is the set ↓ 0 = {0} where 0
is the bottom element of A. Thus while P(A) is a topo-
logical space, its subset composed by only hereditary
subsets of A, used to define the canonical representa-
tion isomorphic to the algebra A, there will not be
topological space (because the empty set will not be
an element of the carrier set of this canonical subalge-
bra of the powerset canonical extension algebra). This
is also seen in power-domains in the domain theory,
where the empty set is often excluded.
This paper follows the following plan:
In Section 2 we show, in a particular example, how we
are able to avoid the matrices used in previous Rep-
resentation theorem frameworks for many-valued log-
ics: we present an autoreferential semantics for many-
valued logics, based on sequents and many-valued val-
uations. In Section 3 we define the main result of this
paper: a new general Representation theorem frame-
work for many-valued logics with truth-invariance en-
tailment, where we replace the duality Algebras (Ma-
trices) - Relational structures by the semantic duality
Algebraic models - Kripke models. In Section 4 we
apply this new Representation theorem framework to
modal many-valued logics, in the particular case when
it is based on complete distributive lattices of truth val-
ues (an autoreferential representation). In Section 5 we
consider a concrete example of Belnap’s bilattice, com-
posed by two (truth and knowledge) complete distribu-
tive lattices, used for applications in logic programming
with incomplete and inconsistent information.
2 Sequents for Many-valued logics
based on complete distributive lat-
tices
The main result of this work is a new representation
theorem for any many-valued logic, based on models of
such a logic, and will be presented in the next section.
In this section instead we will introduce an example of
defining the set of models of a given many-valued logic
 L, based on binary sequent systems for many-valued
logics.
Sequent calculus, introduced by Gentzen [23] and
Hertz [24] for classical logic, was generalized to
the many-valued (m-sequents) case by Rouseau [25]
and others. The tableaux calculi were presented in
[26, 27]. The strict correspondence between the cut-
free m-sequent calculus and closed tableaux has been
presented in [28]. The more detailed information for
interested readers can be found in [29, 30]. This ad-hoc
m-sequent system is not standard one. Consequently,
it is interesting to consider a calculus for many-valued
logics based on standard binary sequents. Such a
standard two-sides sequent calculi for lattice-based
many-valued logics has been elaborated recently (with
an autoreferential Kripke-style semantics for such
logics) in two complementary ways in [20, 31].
A sequent system for the truth-invariance semantics of
the entailment, used in a new representation theorem
in the next Section, was recently presented in [19].
Such a general system does not use the partial ordering
of the truth values in A.
Here we will present another example of a sequence
system, for many-valued logics with a complete
distributive lattice A, with truth-preserving semantics
of the entailment. It is another example, more specific
than that in [19], of how we can define the models of
many-valued logics without using the matrices.
We justify this significant case because the algebras
for all many-valued logics with finite set of logic values
are complete lattices. And also the algebras for fuzzy
logic, belief based logic, etc., [32], with infinite number
of logic values, are complete and distributive lattices as
well. In what follows we will use the approach in [31],
with the valuation-based semantics for many-valued
logic. Given a propositional logic  L a sequent is a
consequence pair of formulae s = (φ;ψ) ∈ F ( L)×F ( L),
denoted also by φ ⊢ ψ.
A Gentzen system, denoted by a pair G = 〈L,〉,
where  is finitary consequence relation on set of
sequents in L = F ( L) × F ( L), is said to be normal if
it satisfies the following conditions: for any sequent
s = φ ⊢ ψ ∈ L and a set of sequents Γ ⊆ L,
1. (reflexivity) if s ∈ Γ then Γ  s
2. (transitivity) if Γ  s and for every s′ ∈ Γ, Θ  s′,
then Θ  s
3. (finiteness) if Γ  s then there is finite Θ ⊆ Γ such
that Θ  s.
4. for any homomorphism σ from L into itself
(i.e., substitution), if Γ  s then σ[Γ]  σ(s), i.e.,
{σ(φi) ⊢ σ(ψi) | φi ⊢ ψi ∈ L}  (σ(φ) ⊢ σ(ψ)).
Notice that from (1) and (2) we obtain the monotonic
property:
5. if Γ  s and Γ ⊆ Θ, then Θ  s.
We denote by C : P(L) → P(L) the closure operator
such that C(Γ) =def {s ∈ L | Γ  s}, with the
properties: Γ ⊆ C(Γ) (from reflexivity (1)); it is
monotonic, i.e., Γ ⊆ Γ1 implies C(Γ) ⊆ C(Γ1) (from
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(5)), and C(C(Γ)) = C(Γ) as well. Thus, we obtain
6. Γ  s iff s ∈ C(Γ).
Any sequent theory Γ ⊆ L is said to be a closed theory
iff Γ = C(Γ). This closure property corresponds to the
fact that Γ  s iff s ∈ Γ.
Each sequent theory Γ can be considered as a bival-
uation (characteristic function) β : L → 2 such that
for any sequent s ∈ L, β(s) = 1 iff s ∈ Γ. We
will use this 2-valued valuation-based semantics in
order to define the sound and complete many-valued
valuation-based semantics for many-valued modal
logics.
Example 1: Let us consider the many-valued modal
logic with a distributive complete lattice (A,⊑) of
truth values (where all truth-values in A are lan-
guage primitives as well), that is an extension of the
Distributive modal logic (distributive lattice logic
DDL) [9, 33] (with ✷ universal modal operator, and
its left adjoint existential modal operator ✸, with
✸ ⊣ ✷) and with negative modal additive operator
¬ : (A,⊑,∨) → (A,⊑,∨)OP , where ∨OP = ∧,
⊑OP=⊒. The binary consequence system G, in this
logic  L, is as follows:
(AXIOMS) G contains the following sequents:
1. φ ⊢ φ (reflexive)
2. φ ⊢ 1, 0 ⊢ φ (top/bottom axioms)
3. φ ∧ ψ ⊢ φ, φ ∧ ψ ⊢ ψ (projections: axioms for
meet)
4. φ ⊢ φ∨ψ, ψ ⊢ φ∨ψ (injections: axioms for join)
5. φ ∧ (ψ ∨ ϕ) ⊢ (φ ∧ ψ) ∨ (φ ∧ ϕ) (distributivity
axiom)
6. ✷(φ ∧ ψ) ⊢ ✷φ ∧ ✷ψ, 1 ⊢ ✷1 (multiplicative
modal property axioms)
7. ✸(φ ∨ ψ) ⊢ ✸φ ∨ ✸ψ, ✸0 ⊢ 0 (additive modal
property axioms)
8. ¬φ ∧ ¬ψ ⊢ ¬(φ ∨ ψ), 1 ⊢ ¬0 (additive modal
negation axiom)
9. The set of sequents that define the poset of the
lattice of truth values (A,⊑): for any two x, y ∈ A, if
x ⊑ y then x ⊢ y is an axiom.
(INFERENCE RULES) G is closed under the
following inference rules:
1. φ ⊢ψ, ψ ⊢ϕ
φ ⊢ϕ (cut/ transitivity rule)
2. φ ⊢ψ, φ ⊢ϕ
φ ⊢ψ∧ϕ ,
φ ⊢ψ, ϕ ⊢ψ
φ∨ϕ ⊢ψ (lower/upper lattice
bound rules)
3. φ ⊢ψ
✷φ ⊢✷ψ ,
φ ⊢ψ
✸φ ⊢✸ψ (monotonicity of modal
operators rules)
4. φ ⊢ψ¬ψ ⊢¬φ (antitonicity of modal negation rule)
5. φ ⊢ψ
σ(φ) ⊢σ(ψ) (substitution rule: σ is substitution
(γ/p)).
Notice that the rules in point 2 are the conse-
quences of the diagonal mapping △ : A → Y , where
Y = A×A and△x = (x, x), (which is both an additive
and multiplicative modal operator), and its Galois
adjunctions with the meet (multiplicative) and join
(additive) operators ∧,∨ : Y → A, i.e., with △ ⊣ ∧
and ∨ ⊣ △; that is △x ≤Y (y, z) (i.e., x ⊑ y and
x ⊑ z) iff x ⊑ ∧(y, z) = y ∧ z, and x ∨ y = ∨(x, y) ⊑ z
iff (x, y) ≤Y △z (i.e., x ⊑ z and y ⊑ z).

The axioms from 1 to 5 and the rules 1 and 2 are
taken from [9] for the DLL and it was shown that
this sequent-based Gentzen-like system is sound and
complete. The system G in Example 1 in only a
guiding example, that will be consider in the rest of
this section. We are able to introduce another logical
connectives for any given many-valued modal logic
(where existential modal operators are monotonic, ad-
ditive and normal) based on the complete distributive
lattice of truth values in A, in order to obtain a similar
sequent system as this in Example 1. Notice that in a
Gentzen-like deductive system G above each sequent
is a valid truth-preserving consequence pair defined by
the poset of the complete distributive lattice (A,⊑)
of truth values (which are also the constants of this
modal propositional language  L). Consequently, each
occurrence of the symbol ⊢ can be substituted by the
partial order ⊑ of this complete lattice.
Definition 4 Truth-preserving entailment: For
any two formulae φ, ψ ∈ F ( L), the truth-preserving
consequence pair (sequent) denoted by φ ⊢ ψ is sat-
isfied by a given valuation I ∈ Vm if I(φ) ⊑ I(ψ).
This sequent is a tautology if it is satisfied by all valu-
ations, i.e., when ∀I ∈ Vm(I(φ) ⊑ I(ψ)).
For a normal Gentzen-like sequent system G of the
many-valued logic  L, with the set of sequents SeqG ⊆ L
and a set of inference rules in RulG, we say that a
many-valued valuation I is its model if it satisfies all
sequents in G. The set of all models of a given set
of sequents (theory) Γ is denoted by ModΓ = {I ∈
Vm|∀(φ ⊢ ψ) ∈ Γ(I(φ) ⊑ I(ψ))} ⊆ Vm ⊂ AV ar.
Proposition 1 Soundness: All axioms of the
Gentzen-like sequent system G of a many-valued logic
 L based on complete distributive lattice (A,⊑) of alge-
braic truth values are the tautologies, and all its rules
are sound for the model satisfiability and preserve the
tautologies.
Proof: It is straightforward to verify (see the Exam-
ple 1) that all axioms are tautologies (all constant se-
quents specify the poset of a complete lattice (A,⊑),
thus are tautologies). It is straightforward to verify
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that all rules preserve the tautologies. Moreover, if all
premisses of any rule in G are satisfied by a given many-
valued valuation I : F ( L) → A, then also the deduced
sequent of this rule is satisfied by the same valuation,
i.e., the rules are sound for the model satisfiability.

It is easy to verify that for any two x, y ∈ A we have
that x ⊑ y iff x ⊢ y, that is the truth-preserving en-
tailment coincides with the partial truth-ordering in a
lattice (A,⊑). Notice that it is compatible with the lat-
tice operators, that is, for any two formulae φ, ψ ∈  L,
φ ∧ ψ ⊢ ψ and φ ⊢ ψ ∨ φ. This entailment imposes
the following restrictions on the logic implication: in
order to satisfy the Deduction Theorem ” z ⊢ x ⇒ y
iff z ∧ x ⊢ y” (i.e., inference rules for elimination and
introduction of the logic connective ⇒, z ⊢x⇒y
z∧x ⊢y and
z∧x ⊢y
z ⊢x⇒y ) by this entailment, the logic implication must
satisfy (the case when z = 1) the requirement that
for any x, y ∈ X , x ⇒ y = 1 iff x ⊑ y, while
it must satisfy x ∧ (x ⇒ y) ⊑ y in order to satisfy
the Modus Ponens inference rule. The particularity
of this entailment is that any consequence pair (se-
quent) φ ⊢ ψ is algebraically an equation φ ∧ ψ = φ
(or, φ ∨ ψ = ψ). It is easy to verify, that in the case
of the classical 2-valued propositional logic this entail-
ment is equal to the classical propositional entailment.
Consequently, this truth-preserving entailment is only
a generalization of the classical entailment for a many-
valued propositional logics.
Remark: It is easy to observe that each sequent is,
from the logic point of view, a 2-valued object so that all
inference rules are embedded into the classical 2-valued
framework, i.e., given a bivaluation β : L→ 2, we have
that a sequent s = φ ⊢ ψ is satisfied when β(s) = 1, so
that we have the relationship between sequent bivalua-
tions and many-valued valuations I used in Definition
4. In fact we have that β = eq◦ < π1,∧ > ◦(I × I) :
L→ 2 is the characteristic function, with π1 first pro-
jection, a valuation I : F ( L)→ A, and eq : A×A→ 2
(defined by eq(a, b) = 1 iff a = b).
Consequently, β(φ ⊢ ψ) = β(φ;ψ) = eq◦ < π1,∧ >
◦(I × I)(φ;ψ) = eq◦ < π1,∧ > (I(φ), I(ψ)) =
= eq < π1(I(φ), I(ψ)),∧(I(φ), I(ψ)) >=
= eq(I(φ),∧(I(φ), I(ψ))) = eq(I(φ), I(φ) ∧ I(ψ)).
Thus β(φ ⊢ ψ) = 1 iff I(φ) ⊑ I(ψ), i.e., when this
sequent is satisfied by I.
From my point of view, this sequent feature, which is
only an alternative formulation for the 2-valued clas-
sical logic, is fundamental in the framework of many-
valued logics, where the semantics for the entailment,
based on algebraic matrices (A, D) is often arbitrary.

Thus, this correct definition of the 2-valued entailment
in the sequent system G, based only on the lattice or-
dering, can replace the current entailment based on the
algebraic matrices (A, D), where D ⊆ A is a subset of
designated elements, which is upward closed. That is,
if x ∈ D and x ⊑ y then y ∈ D (thus 1 ∈ D). Conse-
quently, the matrix-entailment, defined by φ ⊢D ψ, is
valid iff ∀I ∈ Vm.(I(φ) ∈ D implies I(ψ) ∈ D). It is
easy to verify also that φ ⊢ ψ implies φ ⊢D ψ. Thus,
we are now able to introduce the model-theoretic se-
mantics for the many-valued logics:
Definition 5 A many-valued model-theoretic seman-
tics of a given many-valued logic  L, with a Gentzen
system G = 〈L,〉, is a semantic deducibility relation
|=m, defined for any Γ ⊆ L and sequent s = (φ ⊢
ψ) ∈ L by:
Γ |=m s iff ”all many-valued models of Γ are the
models of s”
iff ∀I ∈ Vm( ∀(φi ⊢ ψi) ∈ Γ(I(φi) ⊑ I(ψi)) implies
I(φ) ⊑ I(ψ)) iff ∀I ∈ ModΓ( ∀(φi ⊢ ψi) ∈
Γ(I(φi) ⊑ I(ψi)) implies I(φ) ⊑ I(ψ))
iff ∀I ∈ModΓ( I(φ) ⊑ I(ψ)).
Example 2: Let us consider a many-valued logic with
{p, q, r, r1} ⊆ V ar and many-valued clauses Pr = {p⇐
a, q ⇐ b, r ⇐ p, r ⇐ q}, with a, b ∈ A. The sequent-
based translation of Pr results in a sequent theory Γ =
{p ⊢ a, a ⊢ p, q ⊢ b, b ⊢ q, r ⊢ p ∨ q, p ∨ q ⊢ r}, so
that the set of models of Pr is equal to ModΓ =
{I : V ar → A | I(p) = a, I(q) = b, I(r) = a ∨ b and
I(r1) ∈ A}. Thus we have that Γ |=m (p ∧ q ⊢ a ∧ b)
and Γ |=m (a ∧ b ⊢ p ∧ q) , while for every c ∈ A,
Γ 2m (r1 ⊢ c).

It is easy to verify that the Gentzen-like system
G = 〈L,〉 of a complete-lattice based many-valued
is a normal logic.
Theorem 1 The many-valued model theoretic seman-
tics is an adequate semantics for a many-valued logic
 L specified by a Gentzen-like logic system G = 〈L,〉,
that is, it is sound and complete.
Consequently, Γ |=m s iff Γ  s.
Proof: Let us prove that for any many valued model
I ∈ ModΓ, the obtained sequent bivaluation β =
eq◦ < π1,∧ > ◦(I × I) : L → 2 is the character-
istic function of the closed theory ΓI = C(T ) with
T = {φ ⊢ x, x ⊢ φ | φ ∈  L, x = I(φ)}. From the
definition of β we have that β(φ ⊢ ψ) = β(φ;ψ) =
eq◦ < π1,∧ > ◦(I × I)(φ;ψ) = eq◦ < π1,∧ >
(I(φ), I(ψ)) = eq < π1(I(φ), I(ψ)),∧(I(φ), I(ψ)) >=
eq(I(φ),∧(I(φ), I(ψ))) = eq(I(φ), I(φ) ∧ I(ψ)).
Thus β(φ ⊢ ψ) = 1 iff I(φ) ⊑ I(ψ), i.e., when this
sequent is satisfied by I.
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1. Let us show that for any sequent s, s ∈ ΓI im-
plies β(s) = 1: First of all any sequent s ∈ T is of
the form ϕ ⊢ x or x ⊢ ϕ, where x = I(ϕ), so that
it is satisfied by I (it holds that I(ϕ) ⊑ I(ϕ) in both
cases). Consequently, all sequents in T are satisfied by
I. From Proposition 1 we have that all inference rules
in G are sound w.r.t. the model satisfiability, thus for
any deduction T  s (i.e., s ∈ ΓI) where all sequents
in premisses are satisfied by the many-valued valuation
(model) I, also the deduced sequent s = (φ ⊢ ψ) must
be satisfied, that is, it must hold that I(φ) ⊑ I(ψ), i.e.,
β(s) = 1.
2. Let us show that for any sequent s, β(s) = 1 im-
plies s ∈ ΓI : For any sequent s = (φ ⊢ ψ) ∈ L
if β(s) = 1 then x = I(φ) ⊑ I(ψ) = y (i.e., s is
satisfied by I). From the definition of T , we have
that φ ⊢ x, y ⊢ ψ ∈ T , and from x ⊑ y we have
x ⊢ y ∈ AxG (where AxG are axioms (sequents) in G,
with {x ⊢ y | x, y ∈ A, x ⊑ y} ⊆ AxG , thus satisfied by
every valuation) by the transitivity rule we obtain that
T  (φ ⊢ ψ), i.e., s = (φ ⊢ ψ) ∈ C(T ) = ΓI . So, from
(1) and (2) we obtain that β(s) = 1 iff s ∈ ΓI , i.e.,
the sequent bivaluation β is the characteristic func-
tion of a closed set. Consequently, any many-valued
model v of this many-valued logic  L corresponds to the
closed bivaluation β which is a characteristic function
of a closed theory of sequents: we define the set of
all closed bivaluations obtained from the set of many-
valued models I ∈ ModΓ: BivΓ = {ΓI | I ∈ ModΓ}.
From the fact that Γ is satisfied by every I ∈ ModΓ
we have that for every ΓI ∈ BivΓ, Γ ⊆ ΓI , so that
C(Γ) =
⋂
BivΓ (the intersection of closed sets is also
a closed set). Thus, for s = (φ ⊢ ψ), Γ |=m s
iff ∀I ∈ ModΓ( ∀(φi ⊢ ψi) ∈ Γ(I(φi) ⊑ I(ψi))
implies I(φ) ⊑ I(ψ))
iff ∀I ∈ ModΓ( ∀(φi ⊢ ψi) ∈ Γ(β(φi ⊢ ψi) = 1)
implies β(φ ⊢ ψ) = 1)
iff ∀v ∈ ModΓ( ∀(φi ⊢ ψi) ∈ Γ((φi ⊢ ψi) ∈ ΓI)
implies s ∈ ΓI)
iff ∀ΓI ∈ BivΓ( Γ ⊆ ΓI implies s ∈ ΓI)
iff ∀ΓI ∈ BivΓ( s ∈ ΓI) , because Γ ⊆ ΓI for each
ΓI ∈ BivΓ
iff s ∈
⋂
BivΓ = C(Γ), that is, iff Γ  s.

Consequently, in order to define the model-theoretic
semantics for a many-valued logics, we do not need
to define the ”problematic” matrices: we are able to
use only the many-valued valuations, and many-valued
models (i.e., valuations which satisfy all sequents in Γ
of a given many-valued logic  L).
Differently from the classical logic where a formula is a
theorem if it is true in all models of the logic, here,
in a many-valued logic  L, but specified by a set of
sequents in Γ, for a formula φ ∈ F ( L) that has the
same value x ∈ X (for any algebraic truth-value x) for
all many-valued models I ∈ ModΓ, we have that its
sequent-based version φ ⊢ x and x ⊢ φ are theorems;
that is, ∀I ∈ ModΓ(I(φ) = x) iff (Γ  (φ ⊢ x)
and Γ  (x ⊢ φ)). (For instance, in the case of classical
logic, a formula φ is a theorem iff (Γ  (φ ⊢ 1) and
Γ  (1 ⊢ φ)), while ¬φ is a theorem iff (Γ  (φ ⊢ 0)
and Γ  (0 ⊢ φ))). But such a value x ∈ A does not
need to be a designated element x ∈ D, as in the ma-
trix semantics for a many-valued logic, and it explains
why we do not need the rigid semantic specification by
matrix designated elements.
Thus, by translating a many-valued logic  L into its
”meta” sequent-based 2-valued logic, we obtain an un-
ambiguous theory of truth-invariance inference without
using the matrices.
Remark: There is also another way to reduce the
many-valued logics into ”meta” 2-valued logics, based
on the ontological encapsulation [34], where each
many-valued proposition (or many-valued ground atom
p(a1, .., an)) is ontologically encapsulated into 2-valued
atom pF (a1, .., an, x) (by enlarging original atoms with
new logic variable whose domain of values is the set A).
Roughly, ”p(a1, .., an) has a value x” iff pF (a1, .., an, x)
is true). In fact such an atom is equivalent to the fol-
lowing formula of sequents: (p(a1, .., an) ⊢ x) ∧ (x ⊢
p(a1, .., an)).

Autoreferential possible world semantics:
Based on this Gentzen-like sequent deductive system
G, or more general sequent system in [19], with truth-
invariance semantics for the entailment used in the rest
of this paper (in Definition 6), we are able to define
the equivalence relation ≈L between the formulae of
any propositional logic based on a complete distribu-
tive lattice A in order to define the Lindenbaum algebra
for this logic, ( L/≈L ,⊑), where for any two formulae
φ, ψ ∈  L,
(a) φ ≈L ψ iff φ ⊢ ψ and ψ ⊢ φ, i.e., iff
∀I ∈ Vm.(I(φ) = I(ψ)).
Thus, each element of the quotient algebra  L/≈L is an
equivalence classes, denoted by [φ]; the partial ordering
⊑ is defined by
(b) [φ] ⊑ [ψ] iff φ ⊢ ψ (i.e., if φ ⊑ ψ).
In particular we will consider an equivalence class (set
of all equivalent formulae w.r.t. ≈L) [φ] that has ex-
actly one constant x ∈ A, which is an element of this
equivalence class (we abuse a denotation here by de-
noting by x a formula (logic language constant), such
that has a constant logic value x ∈ A for every inter-
pretation I, as well), and we can use it as the repre-
sentation element for this equivalence class [x]. Thus,
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every formula in this equivalence class has the same
truth-value as this constant. Consequently, we have the
injection iA : A →  L/≈L between elements in (A,⊑)
and elements in the Lindenbaum algebra, such that
for any logic value x ∈ A, we obtain the equivalence
class [x] = iA(x) ∈  L/≈L . It is easy to extend this
injection into an monomorphism between the original
algebra and this Lindenbaum algebra, by definition of
correspondent connectives in this Lindenbaum algebra.
For example: [x ∧ y] = iA(x ∧ y) = iA(x) ∧L iA(y) =
[x] ∧L [y], [¬x] = iA(¬x) = ¬LiA(x) = ¬L[x], etc.. In
an autoreferential semantics we will assume that each
equivalence class of formulae [φ] in this Lindenbaum
algebra corresponds to one ”state - description”. In
particular, we are interested to the subset of ”state
- descriptions” that are invariant w.r.t. many-valued
interpretations I, so that can be used as the possible
worlds in the Kripke-style semantics for the original
many-valued modal logic. But from the injection iA
we can take for such an invariant ”state -description”
[x] ∈  L/≈L only its inverse image x = i
−1
A ([x]) ∈ A.
Consequently, the set of possible worlds in this au-
toreferential semantics corresponds to a particular sub-
set of truth values in the complete lattice (A,⊑): in
this paper we will use the set of join irreducible ele-
ments (Birkhoff’s representation), as semantics based
on prime filters, and one more possible world for the
bottom algebraic truth value. Thus, it is from the eco-
nomical point of view analogous to the semantics based
on prime filters.
3 A new representation theorem
Based on the considerations in the previous para-
graph, we intend to define an algebraic/relational du-
ality in the way that we do not need to define a subset
of designated elements D of a many-valued algebra.
Let I : V ar → A be a given many-valued model of the
logic  L, then we can use the algebraic model (A, I),
instead of o-matrices (A, D). Let Γ be a sequent the-
ory for this logic  L. The intuitive idea is to use the
models ModΓ of the logic  L (notice that I ∈ ModΓ is
not any valuation for the propositional variables but is
a model, and that the representation theorem is inter-
esting only for logics that have at least one model, i.e.,
when ModΓ is not empty).
In what follows we will consider a poset A of truth val-
ues (with partial ordering ⊑ such that at least for each
x ∈ A we have that x ⊑ x) of truth values (nullary
operators of the algebra) for this many-valued logic,
and {oi}oi∈Ø the set of functions oi : A
n → A (with
arity n ≥ 1) assigned to operation names in Ø of the
logic  L = (V ar,Ø,). We assume that the carrier set
of every algebra for a logic  L contains also a set of
propositional variables in V ar, so that the terms of an
algebra A are the terms with variables in V ar.
Consequently, any pair (A, I) can be seen as a ground
term algebra obtained by assigning to V ar the values
in a model I of  L.
Thus, the satisfaction relation |=a will be relative to a
model I of the logic  L instead of the prefixed set of ele-
ments inD. For example, in the case of a logic program
 L we can use the Fitting’s 3-valued fixed point oper-
ator to obtain its well-founded 3-valued model. Here
we will apply the truth-invariance entailment princi-
ple, the idea originally used to define the inference clo-
sure in the bilattice based logics [21], and used recently
to develop a new sequent system for many-valued log-
ics presented in [19] as well: in these two papers has
been described a kind of transformation of the original
many-valued logic into the ’meta’ 2-valued logic. The
set of models ModΓ of a given set Γ of formulae has to
satisfy this truth-invariance principle [19]:
(MV) (∀φ ∈ Γ)(∃x ∈ A)(∀I ∈ModΓ)(I(φ) = x),
that is, the value of each formula in Γ is invariant in
ModΓ.
In any case, in the representation theorem framework
we are interested in establishing what is a canonical iso-
morphic algebra for a logic  L, and its relationship with
Kripke relational structures. So, we can use models
I ∈ModΓ of a logic  L only as mean to obtain these re-
sults. The algebraic satisfaction relation |=a is defined
as follows:
Definition 6 Let  L = (V ar,Ø,) be a logic, (A, I)
be an algebraic logic model of a logic  L, defined by a
mapping I : V ar → A, and φ ∈ F ( L), and I : F ( L)→
A be its unique standard extension to all formulae in a
language  L. Let M be a class of algebraic models.
We define the relation |=a as follows (x ∈ A):
1. (A, I);x |=a φ iff x = I(φ),
2. M;x |=a φ iff (A, I);x |=a φ for every (A, I) ∈
M.
We define the entailment relation of a logic  L by: for
every φ ∈ F ( L), x ∈ A,  L;x  φ iff M;x |=a φ.
Notice that in this definition, analogous to Definition 1,
we do not use the set of designated valuesD, and we are
able to determine which set of formulae is deduced for
each algebraic logic value x ∈ A. It is a generalization
of classical deduction, where  L  φ is equivalent to this
new definition  L; 1  φ, and  L  ¬φ is equivalent to
 L; 0  φ (i.e.,  L; 1  ¬φ). The inference of φ defined
by Definition 1, based on set D of designated values,
can be expressed from this more accurate definition
above by
∨
x∈D  L;x  φ. Thus, this new entailment
relation  given by Definition 6 is more powerful and
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more general than the entailment relation of  L given
by Definition 1.
Notice that if Γ is a sequent theory for  L, then  L;x  φ
iff ∀I ∈ ModΓ(I(φ) = x), that is, in the case of the
sequent system presented in Section 2, Γ  (φ ⊢ x)
and Γ  (x ⊢ φ). Consequently,  satisfies the truth-
invariance principle (MV). Now we can introduce a new
definition of the algebraic/relational duality, as follows:
Definition 7 Let M be a class of all algebraic models
for a given logic  L. Assume that there exists a class
KM of Kripke-models of a logic  L, (K, IK) ∈ KM,
with a Kripke-frame K = (1K , {Rj}j≤n) where 1K
is the set of possible worlds, {Rj}j≤n a finite set of
accessibility relations between them (relational struc-
ture), with a mining mapping IK : V ar → P(1K),
such that there exists a mapping D : M → KM, with
KM = {D(M) | M = (A, I) ∈ M}, and there exists a
mapping E : KM →M such that:
(i) for every Kripke model MK = (K, IK) ∈ KM of  L,
the (AK , IK) = E((K, IK)) ∈ M is an algebraic
model of  L, where AK = (P(1K), {oK}o∈Ø) is an
algebra of subsets of the support 1K of K;
(ii) for every algebraic model M = (A, I) ∈ M of
 L, the (K, IK) = D(M) is a Kripke model over
a set 1K, so that, if E(D(M)) = (AK , IK) then
there is an monotone injection mapping in : A →֒
AK , between truth values of algebras A = (A,⊑
, {o}o∈Ø) and AK = (AK ,⊆, {oK}o∈Ø), where
AK = P(1K), such that IK = in ◦ I and DK =
{in(x) | x ∈ A}.
A representation is autoreferential when 1K ⊆ A.
Example 3:
Let us consider the two following autoreferential rep-
resentations:
Case A: Let us consider the standard propositional
logic  L = (V ar,Ø,), where Ø = {∧,∼} and its
simple Boolean algebra A = (A,⊑, {∧,∼}), where
A = 2 = {0, 1} with logic operators ’and’, ∧, and
logic negation ∼ respectively, with 0 ⊑ 1. Let us take
1K = A = {0, 1} = 2, so that the canonical exten-
sion of the Boolean algebra A is the powerset algebra
(P({0, 1}),⊆, {
⋂
,¬}), with inclusion homomorphism
in : (A,⊑, {∧,∼}) → (P({0, 1}),⊆, {
⋂
,¬}), which
preserves ordering, such that for its bottom and top
elements hold, 0K = in(0) = {0}, 1K = in(1) = {0, 1}.
The negation algebraic operator ¬ is defined by ¬X =
X ⇒ {0}, where the operator (implication) ⇒ is de-
fined by X ⇒ Y =
⋃
{Z ∈ P({0, 1}) | Z
⋂
X ⊆ Y },
for any X,Y ∈ P({0, 1}).
Notice that ¬ is not an involution in P({0, 1}), be-
cause ¬¬({1}) = {0, 1} 6= {1}. But it is an involution
negation operator for the subalgebra of this canonical
extension, (DK , {
⋂
,¬}), where DK = {{0}, {0, 1}} ⊂
P({0, 1}), isomorphic to algebra A and defined by the
image of the inclusion in.
Case B: Let us consider the 4-valued Belnap’s dis-
tributive bilattice A = {f,⊥,⊤, t} with ⊥ for un-
known and ⊤ for inconsistent logic value, f = 0, t = 1
are bottom and top values w.r.t the truth ordering
0 ⊑ ⊥, 0 ⊑ ⊤, ⊥ ⊑ 1, ⊤ ⊑ 1 and ⊥ ⊲⊳ ⊤. It
is the smallest many-valued logic capable of dealing
with incomplete (unknown) and inconsistent logics. In
this case we can take 1K = {0,⊥,⊤} ⊂ A, with
monotone injection in : (A,⊑, {∧,∨}) →֒ (P(1K),⊆
, {
⋂
,
⋃
}) such that: 0K = in(0) = {0}, in(⊥) =
{0,⊥}, in(⊤) = {0,⊤}, 1K = in(1) = {0,⊥,⊤}, i.e.,
DK = {{0}, {0,⊥}, {0,⊤}, {0,⊥,⊤}}.

In this new definition we replaced the old duality Al-
gebras - Relational structures by the semantic duality
Algebraic models - Kripke models of a logic  L.
Notice that in the definition above we do not require
the injection in to be an injective homomorphism, as
in the assumption 2, but we require that the following
diagram commutes (here idAK is the identity mapping
for AK):
V ar
I
✲ A ✛
I
F ( L)
AK
IK
❄ idAK✲ AK
in
❄
✛
idAK AK
IK
❄
Definition 8 Assume that M and KM satisfy the as-
sumptions in 7. Let (K,m) ∈ KM, 1K be the support
of K,with m : V ar → P(1K) and m : F ( L) → P(1K)
be the unique extension of m for all formulae in F ( L).
Let y ∈ 1K and φ ∈ F ( L), then:
1. (K,m) |=y φ iff y ∈ m(φ);
2. (K,m) |= φ iff m(φ) ∈ DK;
3. KM |= φ iff ∀(K,mi), (K,mj) ∈
KM(mi(φ) = mj(φ) ∈ DK).
The following theorem is the basic result for the next
representation theorem, and shows that from Defini-
tion 7 the new relational inference |= is sound and com-
plete w.r.t. the algebraic inference |=a.
Theorem 2 Assume that M and KM satisfy the as-
sumptions in 7. Then, for every φ ∈ F ( L),
if M;x |=a φ then KM |= φ with in(x) = m(φ)
for any (K,m) ∈ KM. The converse also holds.
9
Proof : Assume thatM andR satisfy the assumptions
in 7 and φ ∈ F ( L) such that (A, I);x |=a φ, i.e.,
x = I(φ). Let (K, IK) ∈ KM, m : F ( L) → AK be the
unique extension of m : V ar → P(1K). By (C)(i) we
have that E((K, IK)) = (AK , IK) ∈ M, with AK =
P(1K). Then, from IK = in ◦ I it holds that IK(φ) =
in(I(φ)) = in(x) and (AK , IK); in(x) |=a φ. That is,
for any g : V ar → AK , thus also for m, m(φ) =
IK(φ) = in(x) ∈ DK , in the way that (K,m) |= φ. It
is valid for any (K, IK) ∈ KM, thus KM |= φ.
Let φ ∈ F ( L), with KM |= φ. Then for any M =
(A, I) ∈ M, we have (K, IK) = D(M) ∈ KM. Since
for any (K,m) ∈ KM we know that (K,m) |= φ,
that is, for any m : V ar → AK (thus for IK also),
m(φ) = in(x) ∈ DK for some x ∈ A, so that IK(φ) =
in(x) ∈ DK , and from the fact that IK = in ◦I, we can
take x = I(φ). Thus (A, I);x |=a φ.
Since it holds for any M = (A, I) ∈ M, we obtain
M;x |=a φ.

Corollary 1 Let  L = (V ar,Ø,) be sound and com-
plete logic w.r.t. a class M of algebraic models. As-
sume that there exists a class KM such that the as-
sumption in 7 holds. Then  L is sound and complete
w.r.t. the class KM, which can be regarded as a class
of Kripke-style models.
From this corollary we are able to define a direct dual-
ity between algebraic and Kripke-style semantics for a
logic  L
M
D
✲ KM
E
✲ M
Theorem 3 Representation Theorem: Assume
that M and R satisfy the assumptions in 7. Injec-
tive mapping in can be extended to the injective homo-
morphism in : (A, I) →֒ (AK , IK) , where (K, IK) =
D(A, I). Thus, the dual representation of the algebra
A is the subalgebra of AK defined by image of the ho-
momorphism in.
Proof : It comes from the fact that I and IK are the
homomorphisms between O-algebras. So we can show
it by structural induction on the formulae in F ( L). For
example, for a formula composed by conjunction, φ∧ψ,
with x = I(φ), y = I(ψ), we have that, in(x ∧A y) =
= in(I(φ)∧A I(ψ)) = in(I(φ∧ψ)), from the homo-
morphic property of I
= (in ◦ I)(φ ∧ψ)) = IK(φ ∧ψ), from the commu-
tativity of (C)(ii)
= IK(φ) ∧K IK(ψ) = in(I(φ)) ∧K in(I(ψ))
= in(x) ∧K in(y). Thus, we obtained that the homo-
morphism holds for the restriction of in to the image
of I, but it is generally valid for any I.

Example 4: (The continuation of Example 3)
Let us consider now the algebraic models for  L, based
on the Boolean algebra, (A, I) ∈M, where I : V ar →
2 is the interpretation for propositional variables in
V ar, and on its canonical extension (AK , IK) =
E(D((A, I))), where (K, IK) = D((A, I)), AK =
(P({0, 1}),⊆, {
⋂
,¬}) .
We have that for any p ∈ V ar, I(p) = 1 iff IK(p) =
{0, 1} and I(p) = 0 iff IK(p) = {0}.
We do not have any modal operator in these algebras,
thus the frame K ∈ (K, IK) = D((A, I)) has the set of
only two possible worlds equal to 1K = 2 = {0, 1} and
an empty accessibility relation, that isK = ({0, 1}, {}).
4 Autoreferential representation for
complete distributive lattices
In Examples 3 and 4 we have shown the cases for
this new definition of representation theorem, based on
models of a logic  L, which define only relational struc-
tures K ∈ (K, IK) = D((A, I)), with a set of possible
worlds (support) equal to the set 1K ⊆ A.
In the rest of this paper we will consider the subclass
of complete latices in which each lattice of truth values
(A,⊑,∧,∨) is isomorphic to the complete sublattice
of the powerset lattice (P(A),⊆,
⋂
,
⋃
). Consequently,
we will consider the cases when there exists the subset
S = CL(P(A)) ⊆ P(A), closed under intersection
⋂
and union
⋃
, with the isomorphism is : (A,⊑,∧,∨) ≃
(CL(P(A)),⊆,
⋂
,
⋃
), so that we obtain the inclusion
map in = ⊆ ◦ is : A →֒ AK = P(1K) as required in
Definition 7.
For such a subclass of complete lattices we will ob-
tain that the carrier set A, of the many-valued logic
algebra A, is the set of possible worlds for the Kripke
frame for the dual relational representation of the alge-
braic semantics: this is an autoreferential assumption
[20]. The relational semantic of other modal opera-
tors of the algebra A will be obtained successively by
a correct definition of the accessibility relations of the
Kripke frame.
It is well known that any complete lattice A has the
following property: each (also infinite) subset X of
A has the least upper bound (supremum) denoted by∨
X (when X has only two elements, the supremum
corresponds to the join operator ∨), and the great-
est lower bound (infimum) denoted by
∧
X (when X
has only two elements the infimum corresponds to the
meet operator ∧). Thus, it has the bottom element
0 =
∧
A ∈ A, and the top element 1 =
∨
A ∈ A. The
cardinality of the set of hereditary subsets of A is gen-
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erally greater than the cardinality of the lattice A. But
in what follows we will consider the class of complete
distributive lattices A, for which we are able to define
an isomorphism [35] between the original lattice A and
the particular collection A+ of hereditary subsets of A.
Thus, in each distributive lattice we are able to define
the implication and negation logical operators based
on relative pseudocomplement and pseudocomplement
relatively, i.e., a ⇀ b =
∨
S, S = {x ∈ A|x ∧ a ⊑ b}
and ∼ a = a ⇀ 0.
Example 5: Many-valued logics for approximate
truth enriched by approximation of unknown and in-
consistent information: The class of poset lattices can
also be used for enabling standard fuzzy logic over the
closed interval [0, 1] of reals, with whenever x ≤ y
then x ⊑ y where ≤ is the standard ordering of num-
bers, used for approximation of the truth value, with
ability to consider incomplete (unknown) and mutu-
ally inconsistent information as well. For example,
let us consider an enriched fuzzy logic with the set of
truth values in [0, .5 − △]
⋃
[.5 +△, 1]
⋃
{⊥,⊤} where
.5 − △ ⊑ ⊥ ⊑ 5 + △ and .5 − △ ⊑ ⊤ ⊑ 5 + △, for
an sufficiently small value △ < .5. In the simplest case
we can substitute .5 value with two unrelated values
0.5− = ⊥ and 0.5+ = ⊤. This more expressive fuzzy
logic we will denominate PO-fuzzy logic. This enrich-
ment of the fuzzy logic is obtained by replacement of
the closed subinterval [x−△x, x+△x] of reals by the
discrete Belnap’s bilattice {x − △x,⊥x,⊤x, x + △x}
for an enough small △x. We are able also to repeat
such an operation for a number of such replacements
for different values for x ∈ [0, 1], with the family of
unknown and inconsistent values such that if x ≤ y
then ⊥x ⊑ ⊥y and ⊤x ⊑ ⊤y, and x +△x < y − △y,
in order to have not only the fuzzy approximation of
truth values, but also the approximations of unknown
and inconsistent values. Each such an enrichment is a
distributive lattice.
Obviously, each finite or infinite many-valued logic with
total ordering can be enriched by the family of values
⊥x and ⊤x, for the approximations of the unknown and
inconsistent values, in order to be able to deal with any
kind of incomplete and inconsistent information.
✷
From the Birkhoff’s representation theorem [35] for dis-
tributive lattices, every finite (thus complete) distribu-
tive lattice is isomorphic to the lattice of lower sets
of the poset of join-irreducible elements. An element
x 6= 0 in A is a join-irreducible element iff x = a ∨ b
implies x = a or x = b for any a, b ∈ A. Lower set
(down closed) is any subset Y of a given poset (A,⊑)
such that, for all elements x and y, if x ⊑ y and y ∈ Y
then x ∈ Y .
Proposition 2 [35] 0-Lifted Birkhoff isomor-
phism: Let A be a complete distributive lattice, then
we define the following mapping ↓+: A→ P(A): for
any x ∈ A, ↓+ x = ↓ x
⋂
Â, where
Â = {y | y ∈ A and y is join-irreducible }
⋃
{0}.
We define the set A+ = {↓+ a |a ∈ A } ⊆ P(A), so that
↓+
∨
= idA+ : A
+ → A+ and
∨
↓+= idA : A → A.
Thus, the operator ↓+ is inverse of the supremum op-
eration
∨
: A+ → A. The set (A+,⊆) is a complete
lattice, such that there is the following 0-lifted Birkhoff
isomorphism ↓+: (A,⊑,∧,∨) ≃ (A+,⊆,
⋂
,
⋃
).
Proof : Let us show the homomorphic property of ↓+:
↓+ (x ∧ y) =↓ (x ∧ y)
⋂
Â = (↓ x
⋂
↓ y)
⋂
Â =
= (↓ x
⋂
Â)
⋂
(↓ y)
⋂
Â) =↓+ x
⋂
↓+ y, and
↓+ (x ∨ y) =↓ (x ∨ y)
⋂
Â = (↓ x
⋃
↓ y)
⋂
Â =
= (↓ x
⋂
Â)
⋃
(↓ y)
⋂
Â) =↓+ x
⋃
↓+ y.
The isomorphic property holds from Birkhoff’s repre-
sentation theorem.

The name lifted here is used to denote the difference
from the original Birkhoff’s isomorphism. That is, we
have that for any x ∈ A, 0 ∈↓+ x , so that ↓+ x is
never empty set (it is lifted by bottom element 0).
Notice that (A+,⊆,
⋂
,
⋃
) is a subalgebra of the
powerset algebra (P(A),⊆,
⋂
,
⋃
).
Example 6: Belnap’s bilattice in the Example
5, is a distributive lattice w.r.t. the ≤t ordering,
with two join-irreducible elements ⊥ and ⊤, so
that B̂ = {0,⊥,⊤}. In this case we have that
↓+ 1 =↓+ (⊥ ∨ ⊤) =↓+ ⊥
⋃
↓+ ⊤ =↓ ⊥
⋃
↓ ⊤ =
{0,⊥,⊤} = B̂ 6= ↓ 1 = B.

It is easy to verify that ↓+ 0 = {0} is the bottom
element in A+.
Remark: For a many-valued logic with distribu-
tive complete lattice of truth values we have
that AK = P(1K) ⊆ P(A), with 1K = Â and
DK = A
+, and the injective homomorphism
↓+: A → P(A) corresponds to the injective ho-
momorphism in : (A, I) →֒ (AK , IK) in the
representation theorem 3. Thus, the dual repre-
sentation of this algebra (in this case a distributive
complete lattice) A is the subalgebra (A+,⊆,
⋂
,
⋃
)
of AK , defined by the image of the homomorphism
in =↓+.
Based on these results we are able to extend the com-
plete distributive lattices with other unary algebraic
operators {oi}i∈N : A → A and binary operators
{⊗i}i∈N : A × A → A in order to obtain a class of
algebras ((A,⊑,∧,∨), {oi}i∈N , {⊗i}i∈N ), with the
following set-based canonical representation:
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Proposition 3 Canonical representation: Let
A = ((A,⊑,∧,∨), {oi}i∈N , {⊗i}i∈N ) be a complete dis-
tributive lattice-based algebra.
We define its canonical representation by the algebra
A
+ = ((A+,⊆,
⋂
,
⋃
), {o+i }i∈N , {⊗
+
i }i∈N), such that,
o+i = (↓
+ oi
∨
) : A+ → A+ and ⊗+i = (↓
+ ⊗i
∨
) :
A+ × A+ → A+ are the unary and binary operators
over sets in A+.
Proof: We have that for any x, y ∈ A, ↓+ oi(x) =↓+
oi(
∨
↓+)(x) = (↓+ oi
∨
) ↓+ x = o+i (↓
+ x) and
↓+ ⊗i(x, y) = ⊗
+
i (↓
+ x, ↓+ y). Thus, ↓+ is an iso-
morphism ↓+: A ≃ A+.

Example 7: Let us consider the binary implication
operator ⊗i equal to the relative pseudocomplement
⇀ over a complete distributive lattice. Then, we have
that (↓+ x) ⇀+ (↓+ y) = ⊗+i (↓
+ x, ↓+ y) =↓+
⊗i(x, y) =↓+ (x ⇀ y) =↓+ (
∨
{z | z ∧ x ⊑ y} =
⋃
{↓+
z | z ∧ x ⊑ y} = (from the homomorphism ↓+ w.r.t.
the join operator of this lattice)
=
⋃
{↓+ z | ↓+ (z ∧ x) ⊆↓+ y} = (from ↓+ v ⊆↓+ w
iff v ⊑ w)
=
⋃
{↓+ z | ↓+ z
⋂
↓+ x) ⊆↓+ y} = (from the homo-
morphism ↓+ w.r.t. the meet operator of this lattice)
=
⋃
{S ∈ A+ | S
⋂
↓+ x) ⊆↓+ y}.
That is, we obtain that the correspondent operator
⊗+i : A
+ × A+ → A+ is a relative pseudocomplement
for the lattice A+.

It is well known that the standard unary existen-
tial modal operators are homomorphisms between join
semilattices, oi : (A,⊑,∨) → (A,⊑,∨), and modal
negation operators o˜i : (A,⊑,∨)→ (A,⊑,∨)OP , where
the dual join semilattice (A,⊑,∨)OP has ⊑OP=⊒,
and ∨OP = ∧. For the normal modal logics they
are monotone (x ⊑ y implies oi(x) ⊑ oi(y), and
o˜i(x) ⊑
OP o˜i(y))) , additive (oi(x ∨ y) = oi(x) ∨ oi(y),
and (o˜i(x ∨ y) = o˜i(x) ∨OP o˜i(y) = o˜i(x) ∧ o˜i(y)), and
normal (oi(0) = 0, and o˜i(0) = 0
OP = 1). Now
we are able to show that for any algebraic model
M = (A, I), of a logic  L with relative pseudocomple-
ment for implication and a number of unary modal op-
erators, there exists the correspondent Kripke model
MK = D(M) = (K, IK). In what follows we denote
by ⇒ the logic connective for implication, correspon-
dent to the algebraic relative pseudocomplement ⇀,
by ♦i the existential modal connective for the alge-
braic additive operator oi, and by ¬i the logic negation
modal connective for the algebraic additive negation
operator o˜i, so that for the homomorphism (valuation)
I : F ( L) → A holds that I(φ ⇒ ψ) = I(φ) ⇀ I(ψ),
I(♦iφ) = oi(I(φ)) and I(¬iφ) = o˜i(I(φ)).
Notice that if we denote by ↓A: Â→ P(Â) the restric-
tion of ↓: A → P(A) to the subset of join-irreducible
elements Â ⊆ A, then for any x ∈ Â we obtain
(*) ↓+ x =↓A x = {y ∈ Â | y ⊑ x} ∈ A+ ⊆ P(Â).
Consequently, in the next Kripke-style definition for
modal many-valued logics we will use the set Â, of
join-irreducible elements in A, for the set of possible
worlds.
Now we will define the standard accessibility relation
for any given additive normal modal operator oi and
negation modal operator o˜i.
Definition 9 Let oi : (A,⊑,∨)→ (A,⊑,∨) and nega-
tion operator o˜i : (A,⊑,∨) → (A,⊑,∨)OP , be the ad-
ditive normal modal operators. Then we define the ac-
cessibility relation for oi by
Ri = {(x, y) | y ∈ Â , and x ∈↓+ oi(y)},
and the incompatibility relation for o˜i by
R˜i = {(x, y) | z ∈ A, y ∈↓+ z , and x ∈↓+ o˜i(z)}.
Remark: More about a hierarchy of negation opera-
tors for complete lattices and their relational semantics
can be found in [20]. This semantics is based on the
Birkhoff concept of polarity [35]: If (X,R) is a set with
a particular relation on a set X , R ⊆ X × X , with
mappings λ : P(X)→ P(X)OP , ̺ : P(X)OP → P(X),
such that for subsets U, V ∈ P(X),
λU = {x ∈ X | ∀u ∈ U.((u, x) ∈ R)}, ρV = {x ∈
X | ∀v ∈ V.((x, v) ∈ R)},
where the powerset P(X) is a poset with bottom
element empty set ∅ and top element X , and P(X)OP
is its dual (with ⊆OP inverse of ⊆). Then we have
an induced Galois connection λ ⊣ ρ, i.e., λU ⊆OP V
iff U ⊆ ρV . The additive modal operator λ is
a set-based correspondent operator for the modal
negation operator o˜i, when we consider the relation
R as an incompatibility (or ”perp”) relation R˜i in
Definition 9 for this modal negation operator, and
λU = {x ∈ X | ∀u(u ∈ U implies (u, x) ∈ R˜i)} , which
will be used for the relational Kripke-style semantics
of modal negation operators in what follows.
Example 8: The smallest nontrivial distributive bilat-
tice is Belnap’s 4-valued bilattice [4] B = {t, f,⊥,⊤}
where t is true, f is false, ⊤ is inconsistent (both
true and false) or possible , and ⊥ is unknown. As
Belnap observed, these values can be given two natural
orders: truth order, ≤t, and knowledge order, ≤k,
such that f ≤t ⊤ ≤t t, f ≤t ⊥ ≤t t, ⊥ ⊲⊳t ⊤ and
⊥ ≤k f ≤k ⊤, ⊥ ≤k t ≤k ⊤, f ⊲⊳k t. That is, bottom
element 0 for ≤t ordering is f , and for ≤k ordering is
⊥, and top element 1 for ≤t ordering is t, and for ≤k
ordering is ⊤. Meet and join operators under ≤t are
denoted ∧ and ∨; they are natural generalizations of
the usual conjunction and disjunction notions. Meet
and join under ≤k are denoted ⊗ and ⊕, such that
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hold: f ⊗ t = ⊥, f ⊕ t = ⊤, ⊤∧⊥ = f and ⊤∨⊥ = t.
There is a natural notion of the bilattice truth negation,
denoted ¬, (reverses the ≤t ordering, while preserving
the ≤k ordering): switching f and t, leaving ⊥ and ⊤,
and corresponding knowledge negation (conflation),
denoted −, (reverses the ≤k ordering, while preserving
the ≤t ordering), switching ⊥ and ⊤, leaving f and t.
These two kinds of negation commute: −¬x = ¬ − x
for every member x of a bilattice.
In what follows we will use the relative pseudocomple-
ments, defined by x ⇀ y =
∨
{z | z ∧ x ≤t y}, and
pseudocomplements, defined by ¬tx = ∼ x = x ⇀ f
(and, analogously, for ≤k ordering, x ⇁ y and
¬kx = x ⇁ ⊥).
The conflation is a monotone function that preserves
all finite meets (and joins) w.r.t. the lattice (B,≤t),
thus it is the universal (and existential, because
− = ¬ − ¬) modal many-valued operator: ”it is
believed that” for a bilattice (as in ordinary 2-valued
logic, the epistemic negation is composition of strong
negation ¬t and this belief operator, ¬ = ¬t−), which
extends the 2-valued belief of the autoepistemic logic
as follows:
1. if A is true than ”it is believed that A”, i.e., −A, is
true;
2. if A is false than ”it is believed that A” is false;
3. if A is unknown than ”it is believed that A” is
inconsistent: it is really inconsistent to believe in
something that is unknown;
4. if A is inconsistent (that is both true and false)
than ”it is believed that A” is unknown: really, we can
not tell nothing about believing in something that is
inconsistent.
Remark: Notice that the knowledge negation op-
erator − is normal additive modal operator w.r.t.
the ≤t ordering. As we will see in the next defini-
tion, its dual is truth negation ¬ which is a normal
modal operator w.r.t. the ≤k ordering. Thus, in
the case of the believe (conflation) modal operator
oi = − in Belnap’s bilattice, Â = {f,⊥,⊤}, such
that −f = f, − t = t, − ⊥ = ⊤, − ⊤ = ⊥
(see more in the next section), we obtain that
R− = {(f, f), (f,⊥), (⊤,⊥), (f,⊤), (⊥,⊤)}, while
for the autoepistemic Moore’s operator [13],
oi = µ : B → B, defined by
µ(x) = t if x ∈ {⊤, t}; f otherwise, we have that
Rµ = {(f, f), (f,⊥), (f,⊤)(⊥,⊤), (⊤,⊤)}.
Both of these modal operators are additive and
normal. For the modal negation additive operator
o˜i = ¬, we have that
R˜¬ = {(f, f), (f,⊥), (f,⊤), (⊥,⊥), (⊥, f), (⊤,⊤), (⊤, f)}.

Now we are able to define the relational Kripke-style
semantics for a propositional modal logic  L, based on
the modal Heyting algebras in Proposition 3:
Definition 10 For a complete distributive lattice-
based logics, the mapping D : M → KM is defined
as follows: Let (A, I) ∈ M be an algebraic model of
 L, then MK = (K, IK) = D(A, I) is the correspon-
dent Kripke model, such that K = 〈(1K ,⊑), {Rj}j≤n〉
is a frame, where 1K = Â, Rj is an accessibility re-
lation (given by Definition 9) for a modal operator oj,
and IK : V ar → P(A) is a canonical valuation, such
that for any atomic formula (propositional variable)
p ∈ V ar, IK(p) =↓
+ (I(p)) ∈ DK = A
+. Then,
for any world x ∈ 1K , and formulae ψ, φ ∈ F ( L),
MK |=x p iff x ∈ IK(p),
MK |=x φ ∧ ψ iff MK |=x φ and MK |=x ψ,
MK |=x φ ∨ ψ iff MK |=x φ or MK |=x ψ,
MK |=x φ⇒ ψ iff ∀y ∈ 1K((y ⊑ x and MK |=x φ)
implies MK |=y ψ),
MK |=x ∼ φ iff MK |=x φ⇒ 0,
MK |=x ♦jφ iff ∃y ∈ 1K((x, y) ∈ Rj and
MK |=y φ), for each modal operator oj,
MK |=x ¬jφ iff ∀y ∈ 1K( MK |=y φ implies
(x, y) ∈ R˜j ), for each negation modal operator o˜j .
The mapping E : KM → M is defined as follows: for
any (K, IK) ∈ KM, E(K, IK) = (P(1K), IK) ∈M.
Notice that in the world x = 0 (bottom element in A)
each formula φ ∈ F ( L) is satisfied: because of that
we will denominate this world by inconsistent or trivial
world. The semantics for the implication is the Kripke
modal semantics for the implication of the intuitionistic
logic (only with inverted ordering for the accessibility
relation ⊑).
In any modal logic the set of worlds where a formula
φ is satisfied is denoted by ‖φ‖ = {x | MK |=x φ}, so
that we have MK |=x φ iff x ∈ ‖φ‖.
Theorem 4 Soundness and Completeness: Let
(A, I) ∈ M be an algebraic model of  L and (K, IK) =
D(A, I) be the correspondent Kripke model, with a
frame K = 〈(1K ,⊑), {Rj}j≤n〉, where 1K = Â, and
the canonical valuation IK : V ar → P(A) given by
Definition 10. Than, for any propositional formula φ,
the set of worlds where φ holds is equal to
‖φ‖ = IK(φ) = in(I(φ)) ∈ DK = A+,
where the monotone injection in : A →֒ AK , AK =
P(1K), from Definition 7, satisfies in =↓+.
Proof: By structural induction:
1. For any proposition variable p ∈ V ar, x ∈ Â,
MK |=x p iff x ∈ IK(p) = in ◦ I(p) =↓+ I(p), thus
‖p‖ =↓+ I(p).
2. From MK |=x φ ∧ ψ iff MK |=x φ and MK |=x ψ,
holds that ‖φ ∧ ψ‖ = ‖φ‖
⋂
‖ψ‖ =↓+ I(φ)
⋂
↓+ I(ψ),
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(by structural induction), =↓+ I(φ ∧ ψ)(Prop. 2).
3. Similarly, ‖φ ∨ ψ‖ = ‖φ‖
⋃
‖ψ‖ =↓+ I(φ)
⋃
↓+
I(ψ) =↓+ I(φ ∨ ψ).
4. Suppose that ‖φ‖ =↓+ I(φ) and ‖ψ‖ =↓+ I(ψ).
Then for any x ∈ Â we have that
x ∈ ‖φ ⇒ ψ‖ iff MK |=x φ ⇒ ψ iff
∀y ∈ Â((y ⊑ x and MK |=y φ) implies
MK |=y ψ) iff ∀y ∈ Â((y ∈↓A x and
MK |=y φ) implies MK |=y ψ) iff (from (*)
holds ↓+ x =↓A x) ∀y((y ∈↓+ x
⋂
‖φ‖ implies
y ∈ ‖ψ‖) iff ↓+ x
⋂
‖φ‖ ⊆ ‖ψ‖. So that
S = ‖φ⇒ ψ‖ = {x | ↓+ x
⋂
‖φ‖ ⊆ ‖ψ‖}.
Then, S = idA+(S) =↓
+
∨
S =
⋃
↓+ S (from the
homomorphism ↓+) =
⋃
x∈S ↓
+ x =
⋃
{↓+ x | ↓+
x
⋂
‖φ‖ ⊆ ‖ψ‖} =
⋃
{S′ ∈ A+ | S′
⋂
↓+ I(φ) ⊆↓+
I(ψ)} =↓+ (I(φ) ⇀ I(ψ)) (as shown in the example
5) =↓+ I(φ ⇒ ψ) (from the homomorphism of the
valuation I).
Consequently, ‖φ⇒ ψ‖ =↓+ I(φ⇒ ψ).
5. For any additive algebraic modal operator
oi we obtain an existential logic modal operator
♦i, so that for any x ∈ Â, MK |=x ♦iφ/g
iff ∃y ∈ Â((x, y) ∈ Ri and MK |=y φ/g),
iff ∃y ∈ Â((x, y) ∈ Ri and y ∈↓+ α) , where
α = I(φ/g). Then, ‖♦iφ/g‖ = {x | ∃y((x, y) ∈ Ri
and y ∈↓+ α)} =
= {x | ∃y(y ∈ Â , x ∈↓+ oi(y) and y ∈↓+ α)} =
= {x | y ∈↓+ α and x ∈↓+ oi(y)} = {x | y ∈↓
+ α
and x ∈↓+ oi
∨
({y})} = {x | y ∈↓+ α and x ∈
o+i ({y})} =
⋃
y∈↓+α o
+
i ({y}) = (from the additivity
of oi) = o
+
i (↓
+ α) = ↓+ oi
∨
(↓+ α) = ↓+ oi(α).
Thus, we have that ‖♦iφ/g‖ =↓+ oi(α) =↓+
oi(I(φ/g)) =↓+ I(♦iφ/g).
6. For any additive algebraic negation operator o˜i we
obtain a logic modal negation operator ¬i, so that for
any x ∈ Â, MK |=x ¬iφ iff ∀y( MK |=y φ implies
(x, y) ∈ R˜i ), iff ∀y( y ∈↓+ α implies (x, y) ∈ R˜i ),
where α = I(φ/g). Then, ‖¬iφ/g‖ = {x | ∀y( y ∈↓+ α
implies (x, y) ∈ R˜i )} ⊇
⊇↓+ o˜iα (From definition of R˜i in Def.9). Let us
show that also ‖¬iφ/g‖ ⊆
↓+ o˜iα. Suppose that there exists x ∈ Â (i.e., join-
irreducible) such that x ∈ ‖¬iφ/g‖ but x /∈↓+ o˜iα.
Then we define β =
∨
({x}
⋃
↓+ o˜iα) (from Birkhoff
Th. for distributive lattice each element is uniquely
defined by the specific subset of join-irreducible
elements). Thus (6.1) β > o˜iα.
Then for every γ such that o˜iγ ≥ β (it always exists,
at least for γ = 0, i.e., o˜iγ = 1) we have that
(o˜iγ, γ) ∈ R˜i, (x, γ) ∈ R˜i. In order to have that
x ∈ ‖¬iφ/g‖, i.e., ∀y ∈↓+ α.(x, y) ∈ R˜i it must hold
that ↓+ α ⊆↓+ γ.
Then from o˜iα = (
∨
↓+ is an identity) = o˜i(
∨
↓+ α) =
(from the additive property of the modal nega-
tion o˜i) =
∧
{o˜iy | y ∈↓+ α} ≥
∧
{o˜iy | y ∈↓+
γ} = o˜i(
∨
↓+ α) = o˜iγ, thus, o˜iα ≥ o˜iγ ≥ β
in contradiction with (6.1). Thus, we have that
‖¬iφ/g‖ =↓+ o˜i(α) =↓+ o˜i(I(φ/g)) =↓+ I(¬iφ/g).

This theorem demonstrates that the satisfaction
relation in Definition 10 satisfies the general property
for relational semantics given by point 1 of Definition
8, that is, that holds (K,m) |=x φ iff x ∈ m(φ).
In fact, it holds from the fact that for m = IK ,
(K,m) |=x φ iff x ∈ ‖φ‖ and from this theorem we
have that ‖φ‖ = m(φ).
Notice that in the case when a lattice A is a complete
ordering where for any x ∈ A, ↓+ x =↓ x (for example
in the fuzzy logic), then the minimum requirement for
an unary modal operators oi is to be monotonic.
We do not require it to be surjective, by defining
the accessibility relation as Ri = {(oi(x), x) | x ∈
A}
⋃
{(x, 0) | x ∈ A and ∄y(x = oi(y))}. In that case
we have that MK |=x ♦iφ iff ∃y ∈ A.((x, y) ∈ Ri
and MK |=y φ), iff ∃y ∈ A.(x = oi(y) and
MK |=y φ) iff (by inductive hypothesis ‖φ‖ =↓ I(φ))
∃y ∈ A.(x = oi(y) and y ⊑↓ I(φ)) iff (from the
monotonicity of oi) ∃y ∈ A.(x = oi(y) ⊑ oi(I(φ))) iff
∃y ∈ A.(x = oi(y) ∈↓ oi(I(φ))) iff (such y exists, at
least as 0) x ∈↓ oi(I(φ)) =↓ (I(♦iφ)).
Consequently, ‖♦iφ‖ =↓ (I(♦iφ)) =↓+ (I(♦iφ)).
Finally, from the canonical representation for dis-
tributive complete lattice based modal intuitionistic
logics, we obtained that the isomorphism, between the
original algebra A with unary modal operators and its
canonical representation algebra AK , corresponds to
the representation of any propositional formula φ by
the set of worlds ‖φ‖ where φ holds, in the canonical
Kripke model for the algebra A.
So, for example, the term φ ∧ψ in the original algebra
(A, I) corresponds to the set ‖φ‖
⋂
‖ψ‖ in the canoni-
cal algebra (AK , IK), where ‖φ‖ is the set of worlds in
the canonical Kripke model ((Â,⊑), {Ri}, IK) where
φ holds.
As a consequence we obtained that this simple Kripke
model is the model of the normal modal logic with
inference relation ψ ⊢ φ iff ‖ψ‖ ⊆ ‖φ‖.
In fact, ψ ⊢ φ iff (based on the truth ordering)
I(ψ) ⊑ I(φ) iff (based on the monotonicity of ↓+)
‖ψ‖ =↓+ (I(ψ)) ⊆↓+ (I(φ)) = ‖φ‖ .
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5 Application to Belnap’s bilattice
In this section we will apply the results obtained in
the previous section to the 4-valued Belnap’s bilattice
based logic  L. Such a logic is a significant extension
of normal strong Kleene’s 3-valued logic to the para-
consistent type of logics, where we are able to obtain a
non-explosive inconsistency.
That is a very important class of logics which is able
to deal also with mutually-inconsistent information, in
typical Web data integration of different and indepen-
dent source data with mutually inconsistent informa-
tion [36]. That is the main reason that we applied a
new representation theorem to this case instead of more
complex bilattices.
Bilattice theory is a ramification of multi-valued logic
by considering both truth ≤t and knowledge ≤k partial
orderings. Given two truth values x and y, if x ≤t y
then y is at least as true as x, i.e., x ≤t y iff x <t y or
x = y. The negation operation for these two orderings,
¬ and − respectively, are defined as the involution op-
erators which satisfy De Morgan law between the join
and meet operations.
Definition 11 (Ginsberg [13]) A bilattice B is de-
fined as a sixtuple (B,∧,∨,⊗,⊕,¬), such that: The
t-lattice (B,≤t,∧,∨) and the k-lattice (B,≤k,⊗,⊕) are
both complete lattices, and ¬ : B → B is an involution
(¬¬ is the identity) mapping such that ¬ is a lattice ho-
momorphism from (B,∧,∨) to (B,∨,∧) and (B,⊗,⊕)
to itself.
The following definition introduces the subclass of D-
bilattices [32] (the Belnap’s bilattice is the smallest non
trivial D-bilattice). For more information and a more
compact definition of D-bilattices and their properties,
as well as a number of significant examples, the reader
can use [37].
Definition 12 [37] A D-bilattice B is a distributive bi-
lattice (B,∧,∨,⊗,⊕,¬) with the isomorphism of truth-
knowledge lattices ∂ : (B,≤t) ≃ (B,≤k), which
is an involution. Let us define the unary operator
− =def ∂¬∂ : B → B. Then we say that a D-
lattice is perfect if two truth negations, the intu-
itionistic negation ¬t (pseudocomplement), such that
¬tx =
∨
{z|z ∧ x = 0t}, and the bilattice negation ¬,
are correlated by ¬ = ¬t−.
In each D-bilattice (B,∧,∨,⊗,⊕,¬), the operator −
is selfadjoint modal operator w.r.t. the ≤t, and the
bilattice negation operator for k-lattice satisfy −1k =
0k, −0k = 1k, while −1t = 1t, −0t = 0t.
Corollary 2 [37] For any D-bilattice B the duality op-
erator ∂ can be extended to the following isomorphism
of modal Heyting algebras
∂ : (B,≤t, αt) ≃ (B,≤k, αk), with αt = {∧,⇀,−},
αk = {⊗,⇁,¬},
where ⇀ and ⇁ are the intuitionistic implications (the
relative pseudocomplements) w.r.t. the ≤t and ≤k re-
spectively.
Informally, these dual lattices are the modal extensions
of Heyting algebras. The conjugate modal operators
are the belief operators. As we will see, they corre-
spond also to default negations in dual algebras.
The approach that we will use in order to find the rep-
resentation theorem for a Belnap’s billatice (defined in
Example 8), based on the fact that it is a D-bilattice, is
different than the standard one, based on the natural
duality theorems [38], (a natural duality for a quasi-
variety gives us a uniform method to represent each
algebra in the quasi-variety as the algebra of all con-
tinuous homomorphisms over some structured Boolean
space), but close in spirit to the higher-order Herbrand
model types [39].
A many-valued interpretation of a logic  L in an al-
gebraic model (A, I) = ((B,≤k, αk), I) is of the form
I : V ar → B, while for its extension (AK , IK)
= E(D((A, I))) the interpretation is of the higher-order
type IK : V ar → AK ⊆ P(B) ≃ 2
B. That is, it maps
each propositional variable in V ar to a logical value
which is a function f in 2B. Really, it maps to some
subset S of B, but such a set can be equivalently repre-
sented by its characteristic function f ∈ 2B, such that
S = {α ∈ B|f(α) = 1}. In what follows we will use
both of these equivalent set-based and functional rep-
resentations.
Both latices (B,≤t) and (B,≤k) are distributive latices,
thus, from the Proposition 2 we obtain that
1. For the truth-ordered lattice (B,≤t): B
+
t = {↓
+
a |a ∈ B } =
{{f}, {f,⊥}, {f,⊤}, {f,⊥,⊤}} ⊆ P({f,⊥,⊤}),
with bottom 0t =↓+ f =↓ f = {f}, and top ele-
ment 1t =↓+ t =
⋃
x∈St={⊥,⊤}
↓ x = {f,⊥,⊤}.
That is, we have the isomorphism it =↓+: (B,≤t
) ≃ (B+t ,⊆) ⊂ (P(1t),⊆), such that it(f) =
{f}, it(⊥) = {f,⊥}, it(⊤) = {f,⊤} and it(t) =
{f,⊥,⊤}, which satisfies the requirement (C)(ii)
for inclusion in ≡ it.
2. For the knowledge-ordered lattice (B,≤k): B
+
k =
{↓+ a |a ∈ B } =
{{⊥}, {⊥, f}, {⊥, t}, {⊥, f, t}} ⊆ P({⊥, f, t}),
with bottom 0k =↓+ ⊥ =
↓ ⊥ = {⊥}, and top element 1k =↓
+ ⊤ =⋃
x∈Sk={f,t}
↓ x = {⊥, f, t}.
That is, we have the isomorphism ik =↓+: (B,≤k
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) ≃ (B+k ,⊆) ⊂ (P(1k),
⊆), such that ik(⊥) = {⊥}, ik(f) = {⊥, f}, ik(t) =
{⊥, t} and ik(⊤) = {⊥, f, t}, which satisfies the re-
quirement (C)(ii) for inclusion in ≡ ik.
These two lattices (B+t ,⊆) and (B
+
k ,⊆) satisfy the clo-
sure property [40] for elements of these lattices (from
Proposition 2), and we are able to define the relative-
pseudocomplements for them (see the Example 5),
⇀+=↓+⇀
∨
for B+t and ⇁
+=↓+⇁
∨
for B+k . Thus,
(B+t ,⊆, {
⋂
,⇀+}) and (B+k ,⊆, {
⋂
,⇁+}) are Heyting
algebras. The negation is defined by ¬tX = X ⇀+ 0t
for any X ∈ B+t , and by ¬kX = X ⇁
+ 0k for any
X ∈ B+k , respectively.
But as Halmos has shown [41], in the structures as
(B+t ,⊆) (and also (B
+
k ,⊆)) each closed element is also
open and can support also the modal operator ⋄ con-
jugate to itself. This is exactly our case.
Proposition 4 Let ⋄t and ⋄k be two operators on sets
such that for a given set X ∈ P(1t), ⋄tX = {−x | x ∈
X}, and for Y ∈ P(1k), ⋄k Y = {¬y | y ∈ Y }.
Then (P(1t),⊆, {
⋂
,⇀+, ⋄t}) and (P(1k),⊆, {
⋂
,⇁+
, ⋄k}) are modal extensions of Heyting algebras.
Their restriction on B+t and B
+
k are ⋄t =↓
+ −
∨
,
⋄k =↓+ ¬
∨
, and (B+t ,⊆, {
⋂
,⇀+, ⋄t}) and (B
+
k ,⊆
, {
⋂
,⇁+, ⋄k}) are modal Heyting algebras.
Proof : We have that ⋄t({f}) = {−f} = {f}, so
⋄t is normal modal operator, and, for any two sets
X,Y ∈ P(1t), ⋄t (X
⋃
Y ) = {−x | x ∈ X
⋃
Y } =
{−x | x ∈ X or x ∈ Y } = {−x | x ∈ X}
⋃
{−x | x ∈
Y } = ⋄t (X)
⋃
⋄t(Y ), that is, ⋄t is additive.
It is easy to show that for any X ∈ B+t , ⋄t X =
¬t ⋄t¬tX = ✷tX ∈ B
+
t , thus ⋄t ≡ ✷t, that is, it is con-
jugate to yourself. The same holds for ⋄k w.r.t. B
+
k ,
thus (B+t ,⊆, {
⋂
,⇀+, ⋄t}) and (B
+
t ,⊆, {
⋂
,⇁+, ⋄k})
are modal Heyting subalgebras of (P(1t),⊆, {
⋂
,⇀+
, ⋄t}) and (P(1k),⊆, {
⋂
,⇁+, ⋄k}) respectively.

From Definition 10 and Theorem 4, for Kripke frames
of these modal Heyting algebras we have that Kt =
(1t,≤t, R−), where for the modal operator ⋄t the ac-
cessibility relation is R− = {(x, y) | y ∈ 1t , and
x ∈↓+ −(y)} = {(f, f), (f,⊥), (⊤,⊥), (f,⊤), (⊥,⊤)}.
Dually, for knowledge ordering we obtain the Kripke
frame Kk = (1k,≤k, R¬), where for a modal operator
⋄k the accessibility relation is R¬ =
{(x, y) | y ∈ 1k , and x ∈↓+ ¬(y)} =
{(⊥,⊥), (⊥, f), (t, f), (⊥, t), (f, t)}.
It is easy to verify that these two Kripke frames are
dual, i.e., ∂P : Kt ≃ Kk.
Notice that we do not represent the bilattice nega-
tion ¬ as an independent modal negation operator (in
the truth-ordering lattice) with an incompatibility re-
lation (in Definition 9) R¬, because in Belnap’s bilat-
tice (see Example 7) it is derived as the composition
¬ = −¬t = ¬t− of the selfadjoint (existential and uni-
versal) operator − (conflation) and pseudocomplement
¬t. It is represented as selfadjoint modal operator in
dual (knowledge ordering) lattice instead. Thus, for
the propositional intuitionistic autoepistemic 4-valued
logic  L = (V ar, {∧,⇒, ♭},), where ⇒ is the intu-
itionistic implication and ♭ the belief modal operator,
we have:
Theorem 5 (Representation Theorem for Belnap’s
D-bilattice)
Let ∂ : (B,≤t, αt) ∼= (B,≤k, αk) be a D-bilattice iso-
morphism for Belnap’s bilattice B, with αt = {∧,⇀
,−} and αk = {⊗,⇁,¬}, and I : V ar → B be a
many-valued interpretation of intuitionistic autoepis-
temic logic  L = (V ar, {∧,⇒, ♭},). Let the isomor-
phism ∂P be the extension of the isomorphism ∂ to
sets, that is, for any set X ∈ P(1t), ∂PX = {∂x | x ∈
X} ∈ P(1k), while ∂∗P be its reduction to B
+
t and B
+
k
respectively. Then the following commutative diagram,
where I ′ = ∂I, It =↓
+
t I, Ik =↓
+
k ∂I, B
+
k = ∂
∗
P(B
+
t ),
1k = ∂P(1t), for algebraic models of  L holds
((B,≤t, αt), I)
∂
✲ ((B,≤k, αk), I
′)
((B+t , {
⋂
,⇀+, ⋄t}), It)
↓+t
❄
∂∗P✲ ((B+k , {
⋂
,⇁+, ⋄k}), Ik)
↓+k
❄
((P(1t), {
⋂
,⇀+, ⋄t}), It)
it
❄
∂P
✲ ((P(1k), {
⋂
,⇁+, ⋄k}), Ik)
ik
❄
(E ◦ D)((B,≤t, αt), I)
=
❄ ∂P
✲ (E ◦ D)((B,≤k, αk), I
′)
=
❄
where int, ink are injective homomorphisms, and ↓
+
t
, ↓+k are the isomorphisms of ↓
+ w.r.t the truth and
knowledge ordering respectively.
Proof : it is easy to verify, based on the precedent
propositions 2, 3, 4, and definition 12. Let us con-
sider a simple case, for the term ⊥∧⊤ ∈ (B,≤t, {∧,⇀
,−}). Then, (∂∗P ↓
+
t )(⊥ ∧ ⊤) = ∂
∗
P({f,⊥}
⋂
{f,⊤}) =
{⊥, f}
⋂
{⊥, t} = {⊥} =↓+k (f ⊗ t) = (↓
+
k ∂)(⊥ ∧⊤).

In this diagram we have to consider the horizontal ar-
rows as a D-bilattice, from up to down: Belnap’s orig-
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inal D-bilattice, its set-based isomorphic Representa-
tion, and its powerset extension. Notice that all arrows
(homomorphism between modal Heyting algebras) of
the commutative diagram on the top are isomorphisms.
The lower part of the commutative diagram represents
the fact that the modal Heyting algebras of isomorphic
representations are the subalgebras of the powerset ex-
tensions.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we defined a new framework for repre-
sentation theorem, based on models of a given many-
valued modal logic  L with truth-invariance entailment,
which is able to establish more close link between al-
gebraic and Kripke-style models for such non-classical
logics.
The truth-invariance semantics of the entailment is dif-
ferent from the matrix-based entailment, and, conse-
quently, this representation theorem is substantially
different from all previous representation theorems
with matrix-based semantics.
For the particular subclass of distributive complete lat-
tices we obtain the possibility to define the canonical
powerset extension algebra, based on the subsets of its
carrier set of logic values, and its unique subalgebra
isomorphic to the original many-valued algebra with
modal operators.
The resulting Kripke frame of the correspondent
Kripke-style models of  L has as the set of possible val-
ues the join-irreducible subset (with 0 element also) of
the carrier set of logic values of the many-valued al-
gebra, in the way that we are able to represent the
concrete Kripke models for a logic  L. Unlike the stan-
dard method based on the natural duality theorem [38],
where a class R of relational structures would be the
family of duals of algebras, difficult to describe in a
simple logic language, our approach offers a very simple
and compact autoreferential description. I believe that
main results (representation theorem) can also be ob-
tained by Priestley duality in a different manner. The
second contribution of this paper is dedicated to the
representation theorem for Belnap’s bilattice, which
has recently been used for logic programs in Semantic
Web applications [36] in order to deal with incomplete
and partially inconsistent information.
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